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Environmental issues such as recycling, energy 
conservation, and resource preservation have been studied by 
many academic disciplines because of the obvious importance 
and impact the environment has on our lives. For example, 
environmental issues and concerns have been studied by 
economists, sociologists, ecologists, and social 
psychologists (e.g., Marwell & Ames, 1979; Edney, 1980). 
Much of their research frames environmental problems in terms 
of social dilemmas. 
A social dilemma is characterized as a situation in 
which the reasonable individual pursuit of a relatively short 
term gain can lead to collective disaster in the long run. 
In other words, a social dilemma is a situation that poses an 
individual with a conflict between pursuing his/her 
individual gain and pursuing the gain of a group to which 
he/she belongs (Fleishman, 1988). Because the pursued gain 
is common or accessible to all, individuals can still acquire 
and enjoy gains by getting a "free-ride" on the efforts of 
others. Also, an individual that contributes to the 
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collective good while others do not, can feel like a 
"sucker". Therefore, it is always best or more profitable 
for the individual to act selfishly regardless of what others 
do. However, if everyone adopts this preferable or 
"dominant" strategy, no one will be contributing to the 
collective good, and collective disaster is inevitable. 
Hardin's (1968) "Tragedy of the Commons" is a classic 
example of a social dilemma and the inevitable disaster of 
collective selfish behavior. This model entails a grazing 
ground for cattle that is accessible to a group of individual 
farmers. Each farmer can increase their profit by adding 
another animal to the collective pasture. The choice of 
adding another animal involves cost in terms of the amount of 
pasture consumed and damaged, but these costs are absorbed by 
the collective group of farmers and not any one individual 
farmer. Because there is the ability to ignore some of the 
costs of their actions, each farmer will be more likely to 
keep adding cattle, and since the opportunity exists for all, 
that is what they all will do. However, individual benefits 
are likely to be much less than the aggregate costs absorbed 
by the over use of the pasture, and eventually the commons 
will be destroyed. 
Since the dominant strategy in a social dilemma is to 
act in one's own self-interest (Hamburger, 1973), early 
social dilemma research focused on the "free-rider 
hypothesis". This hypothesis predicts that people are 
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independent, rational, profit-seeking decision makers who 
will not cooperate (i.e., not help provide or maintain a 
collective good). In essence, this hypothesis predicts that 
people will never cooperate in a dilemma situation. However, 
a series of later studies indicated that cooperation in a 
dilemma situation was not always zero (Marwell & Ames, 1979, 
1980) . 
In addition, studies have shown that other variables 
also influence the rate of cooperation. Rapoport et al. 
(1962) and Bixentine et al. (1966) noted a greater degree of 
cooperation in two-person dilemma games than in comparable 
three- and six-person dilemma games. An inverse relation 
between group size and cooperation was also reported by 
Marwell and Schmidt (1972) who studied two- and three-person 
uniform dilemma games. 
Edney and Harper (1978) studied the effect of 
communication on cooperation. In their study participants 
were asked to play a game where they could take or ref rain 
from taking points from a common pool that replenished itself 
in proportion to the number of points remaining. Groups that 
were allowed to communicate exhibited more communication and 
"harvested" more points. Relatedly, Dawes, Van de Kragt, and 
Orbell (1988) suggested that during communication a consensus 
of promising to cooperate indicates group identity, and this 
group identity either interacts with cooperative commitments 
to make the commitments effective, or may in itself be 
sufficient to elicit cooperation. 
4 
Several studies compared private with public choice and 
found higher rates of cooperation when choice was public 
(e.g., Fox & Guyer, 1978). However, it was noted that the 
difference was minimal and may have been greater if 
participant's payoffs were significantly larger. Rapoport 
(1987) purported that manipulating the reward structure or 
payoffs of the choice should influence cooperation. Three 
paradigms were discussed and labeled "fear plus greed", "no 
fear", and "no greed". In the fear plus greed paradigm 
(i.e., a typical social dilemma), each of the players 
receives a sum of money and then may choose independently and 
anonymously whether to contribute it to a monetary public 
good. The good is provided to all the players if a specified 
number of players or more contributes. In the "no fear" 
paradigm, the opportunity to free-ride is maintained, but 
players are protected from having their contribution wasted. 
The "no greed" paradigm does not protect players from wasting 
their contributions, but does not permit players to free-
ride. Whereas it is predicted both the no fear and no greed 
paradigms will increase cooperation, the no fear paradigm 
should elicit more cooperation since an individual will not 
lose or waste their contribution. However, research results 
have shown that only the no greed condition led to greater 
cooperation (Simmons et al., cited in Rapoport, 1987). 
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Whether a player perceives a loss or gain of their 
contribution has been traced to the inherently different 
decision formulations (framing) of the various types of 
social dilemmas (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Although social 
dilemmas may be classified in a variety of ways (Messick & 
Brewer, 1983), two basic types of social dilemmas are 
frequently studied, the "public goods problem" (e.g., 
Chamberlain, 1984) and the "commons dilemma" (e.g., Dawes, 
1980). The former involves the individual decision of 
whether to contribute to a common resource, and the latter a 
decision to take from a common resource. Examples of the 
public goods problem include the decision to contribute to 
charity and medical research, and examples of the commons 
dilemma include the decision to participate in recycling and 
energy conservation efforts. 
The public goods and the commons dilemma can be 
perceived to provide individuals with a rationally or 
economically equivalent decision and outcome (Brewer & 
Kramer, 1986). In a public goods dilemma, people must decide 
whether to give up an immediate benefit to themselves (donate 
money) for the collective good in the long run. People faced 
with a commons dilemma must decide whether to accept a 
smaller benefit for themselves (recycle) in order to sustain 
a collective resource and accrue larger benefits in the 
future. Thus, individuals faced with either dilemma will 
have less for themselves in the short run if they choose to 
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act in the collective interest. However, prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1984) suggests that although the two 
dilemmas provide the same objective outcome, the decisions of 
the two are formulated or framed differently and may not be 
regarded as equivalent psychologically. That is, the initial 
framing of a decision may influence the choice preferences of 
individuals. 
According to prospect theory, a persons utility or value 
function is concave above his/her reference points (current 
worth) and convex below them. Thus a value function for 
gains is different than a value function for losses. 
Therefore, when a decision is initially formulated in terms 
of immediate losses, an individual may prefer to select an 
alternative that is "risk-seeking". This means, an 
individual will experience "escalation" or the tendency to 
not want to accept immediate certain loss and prefer a gamble 
that may either result in larger future losses or few if any 
losses (Jackson, 1988). Conversely, when a decision is 
initially formulated in terms of immediate gains, an 
individual may prefer to select an alternative that is "risk-
averse" (i.e., a sure thing). Prospect theory would predict 
that a public goods problem, which frames the initial 
decision in terms of an immediate small loss for uncertain 
future benefits, should tend to elicit more selfish (risk-
seeking) choices than does a commons dilemma which frames the 
initial decision in terms of smaller immediate gain to 
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prevent detrimental consequences in the future. Despite the 
strong framing effects reported by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1984), research regarding the impact of decision framing on 
choice behavior (i.e., cooperate/act for the collective good 
or defect/act out of self-interest) has provided equivocal 
results (Schwartz-Shea & Simmons, 1986). 
Inconsistent framing effects have been argued to stem 
from the inability to identify the more or less risky choice 
in the game paradigms (i.e., the "give-some" game for the 
public goods dilemma and the "take-some" game for the 
commons dilemma) used to study social dilemmas (Rutte, Wilke, 
& Messick, 1987). The give-some and take-some games are "N-
person dilemma games" that present groups of people with an 
interdependent choice and outcome. In the give-some game 
each person is presented with an initial choice to either 
give or not give a specified amount of money back to the 
experimenter, and in the take-some game the initial choice is 
to take or not take a specified amount from a common pool of 
money. In both games, the cooperative choice results in a 
smaller individual gain than the non cooperative choice, but 
if all players decide to not cooperate, the individual payoff 
is less than if all decided to cooperate. The games are 
interdependent because each persons resultant outcome is 
contingent upon the choice of each other group member. 
Therefore, the argument for the ambiguity of the meaning for 
the amount initially given or taken (i.e., a large or small 
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amount can be considered a risky decision), is invalid for 
studies using games such as the give-some and take-some game 
because players initially give or take a fixed amount. 
McDaniel and Sistrunk (1991) attributed the absence of 
reliable framing effects to "inadequately established 
reference points." In other words, they postulated that the 
instability of a collective payoff over iterated trials of a 
dilemma game combined with varying amounts of individual 
contributions or withdrawals from the collective resource may 
lead to inequivalent gains and losses. By controlling for 
instability and variability, they evidenced reliable framing 
effects. Consistent with prospect theory, they found 
individuals were more willing to contribute to a collective 
good than to experience some personal loss to avoid the 
destruction of an existing collective good. Also, across 
both the public goods and commons dilemmas, individual 
member's level of cooperation increased when higher 
proportions of others were expected to cooperate. 
In contrast to the latter finding of McDaniel and 
Sistrunk, earlier work by Fleishman (1988) indicated that 
when others were expected to cooperate, individuals would 
conform to others' behavior when faced with a commons 
dilemma, but act contrary to others' behavior when they could 
give to a public good. Although the results of this study 
were also consistent with the framing effects predicted by 
prospect theory, Fleishman speculated that ethical 
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implications of actions may also influence cooperative 
decisions. He stated "A nonaction [or action] by others may 
be sufficient justification for acting inappropriately [or 
appropriately] oneself; [however], when others are not 
generous, one can feel morally superior by giving to a 
collective effort." As a result, Fleishman suggested that 
ethical/moral orientations should be incorporated into any 
model for a social dilemma decision-making process and thus 
studied more extensively. 
Interestingly, the effect of the ethical implications of 
actions had been touched upon in earlier studies on 
"moralizing". Studies on the effects of moralizing (see 
review by Dawes, 1981) attempted to see if a sermon about 
ethics, group benefit, exploitation, whales, and so on 
influenced individual choice behavior in a social dilemma. It 
was reported that these sermons increased the rate of 
cooperation. Unfortunately, the results of this study are in 
an unpublished manuscript and there have been no further 
studies to assess why these sermons worked. 
Further studies assessing the effects of sermons or 
other forms of communicated persuasive appeals on social 
dilemma decision-making are needed because of the vast body 
of literature on the message-learning approach indicating 
such appeals are effective means of influencing people. 
According to the message-learning approach, "persuasive 
contexts (e.g., sources and messages) question a recipient's 
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initial attitude, recommend the adoption of a new attitude, 
and provide incentives {e.g., promises to reduce an 
unpleasant drive-state such as fear) for attending to, 
yielding to, and retaining the new rather than the initial 
attitude" {Petty & Cacioppo, pg. 60, 1981). In regards to 
the persuasive context of a message, the type and extent of a 
message's characteristics {factors) influence how effective a 
message may be in changing one's beliefs, attitudes, and/or 
behaviors. 
A persuasive message is more effective when it can be 
easily comprehended {Gardner, 1966). The importance of 
message comprehension was highlighted by a study by Eagly 
{1974). In this study, participants were presented with one 
of three versions of a message advocating that people need 
much less sleep than they typically get. One group of 
participants heard a highly comprehensible version {a 
reasoned sequence of arguments), a second group heard a 
moderately comprehensible version {the sentences were split 
in half and randomly put back together so that they 
"appeared" to make sense), and a third group heard a poorly 
comprehensible version of the message {the words of all the 
sentences were completely randomized). Not surprisingly, the 
participants in the high comprehensibility condition were the 
most persuaded and recalled the most message arguments. 
The likelihood of changing a person's attitude also 
increases as the number of arguments increases - sometimes. 
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Calder, Insko, and Yandell (1974) conducted a study in which 
participants served as "jurors" in a simulated bigamy trial 
and heard either one or seven arguments favoring either the 
defense or the prosecution. They found that the side having 
the most arguments for its case was the most persuasive. 
In contrast, Norman (1976) had participants read a 
statement made by either an expert or a physically attractive 
source. Both statements advocated people need less than 8 
hours of sleep. However, half the participants only read the 
statement and the other half also read a three and one-half 
page message containing six arguments for sleeping less. 
Whereas participants agreed with the advocated statement from 
the attractive source regardless of whether supporting 
arguments were provided, the provision of supporting 
arguments increased the persuasive impact of the statement 
when it was from an expert. It was reasoned that an expert 
source may be more persuasive than an attractive source 
because he/she causes recipients to attend to and think about 
the reasons provided for adopting a recommendation. However, 
given an expert source, one should be careful to not provide 
too many arguments because this could lead to boredom and 
irritation of the recipient (Cacioppo & Petty, 1979b). 
Several other message factors have been found to 
increase persuasion. A one-sided message tends to be more 
persuasive for people who initially agree with the advocacy 
and two-sided messages seem to be more persuasive for people 
12 
who initially disagree (Lumsdaine & Janis, 1953). A 
conclusion to a message usually helps a recipient understand 
and remember fully the message arguments and advocacy (e.g. 
Hovland & Mandell, 1952); however, if a recipient draws a 
conclusion on his/her own, a higher degree of persuasion is 
likely than if the conclusion was drawn by the source (e.g., 
Linder & Worchel, 1970). Miller and Campbell (1959) 
purported a "primacy" and "recency" effect of messages on 
persuasion. In other words, their study resulted in 
participants being persuaded more by the first and the last 
message of a series of messages heard over time. Finally, a 
substantial amount of literature has assessed and 
demonstrated the effectiveness of messages that arouse and 
reduce fear or emphasize the positive consequences of a 
communicator's recommendation. Such messages are called fear 
appeals and positive appeals, respectively. 
One of the first studies on fear appeals and attitude 
change was the classic experiment by Janis and Feshbach 
(1953). In their study they postulated that fear appeals 
entail the implicit use of aroused emotional tension to more 
highly motivate recipients to accept reassuring beliefs or 
recommendations advocated by a communicator (source). To 
test their hypothesis, they created three similar forms of a 
communication recommending good oral hygiene. Each of the 
messages had the same basic information about the causes of 
tooth decay and the same recommendations concerning dental 
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practices, but differed in the amount of fear-arousing 
material that was included. The high-fear message included 
discussions of how poor dental hygiene can lead to diseased 
gums, painful toothaches, and spreading infections that may 
result in secondary infections causing such things as 
arthritic paralysis, kidney damage, or total blindness. The 
moderate message described the same dangers as the high-fear 
message but did so in a more detached factual fashion. 
Finally, the low-fear message discussed primarily neutral 
information about the growth and function of teeth. Janis 
and Feshbach found a marginally significant difference (~ < 
.10) between the three messages that suggested the low-fear 
appeal was most effective in influencing the practice of good 
oral hygiene. They argued that the high-fear message was too 
disturbing and frightening, and it created defensive 
avoidance or the desire to avoid thinking about the issue(s). 
Further research on fear appeals found that high-fear 
appeals were typically more effective than low or moderate 
appeals (Leventhal, 1970). Janis and Feshbach's findings 
were attributed to the fact that although their study's high-
fear message made recipients uncomfortable about their oral 
hygiene, the message did not provide any recommended means of 
protection. Generally, a high-fear appeal will be an 
effective means of persuasion if the message describes: 1) 
the unfavorableness of the consequences that will occur if 
the recommended actions are not adopted; 2) the likelihood 
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that the consequences will occur if the recorrunended actions 
are not adopted; and 3) the likelihood that the consequences 
will not occur if the recorrunended actions are adopted (Hass, 
Bagley, & Rogers, 1975; Rogers, 1975; Rogers & Mewborn, 
1976) . In short, a message arouses fear in a person by 
questioning the adaptiveness of the current s.ituational 
context (Mewborn & Rogers, 1979). 
The fear appeals counterpart, the positive appeal, also 
has been assumed to be an effective persuasive factor when 
similar criteria are met (Jackson, 1988). That is, a 
positive persuasive appeal (i.e., a message that emphasizes 
the positive consequences of a corrununicator's recorrunendation) 
should be effective in inducing attitude change when the 
message describes: 1) the favorableness of the consequences 
that will occur if the recorrunended actions are adopted; 2) 
the likelihood that the consequences will occur if the 
recorrunended actions are adopted; and 3) the likelihood that 
the consequences will not occur if the recorrunended actions 
are not adopted. In contrast to the research on fear 
appeals, the amount of literature is minimal and the results 
on the effects of positive appeals have been dubious at best. 
Some studies on positive appeals have suggested that 
they have no consistent effect on attitude and behavior 
change (Perkins & Scott, 1986). In addition, positive 
appeals are typically less persuasive than comparable fear 
appeals (e.g., Robberson & Rogers, 1988). However, there are 
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studies that have indicated positive appeals may be just as 
effective if not more effective than a fear appeal (e.g., 
Evans, 1980). The unequivocal results regarding positive 
appeals should be interpreted with caution because most of 
the research seems to have focused on the promotion of health 
behaviors (e.g., not smoking and exercise). Positive appeals 
may demonstrate more consistent persuasive effects and/or 
greater persuasive effects than a fear appeal in another 
context (e.g., a social dilemma). 
Since reliable framing effects have been demonstrated 
throughout much of the social dilemma literature and there is 
a lack of research regarding the effects of persuasive 
appeals on dilemma choice and positive appeals in general, 
the present study utilized the framework and predictions 
outlined by prospect theory to investigate if two appeals 
(i.e., negative/fear-arousing/losses oriented and 
positive/moral/gains oriented ) may influence cooperative 
behavior in a public goods and commons dilemma. More 
specifically, the intent of this study was to assess whether 
the content of a message (e.g., fear-arousing, or positive 
and ethical/moral as suggested by Fleishman, 1988) that 
promotes cooperation will override the payoff structure of a 
dilemma that promotes non cooperative behavior, and thus lead 
to a higher rate of observed cooperation. 
The following was predicted. 1) A fear appeal 
emphasizing individual losses would yield higher rates of 
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cooperation in the public goods problem (give-some game) . 
This is because the public goods decision is initially framed 
in terms of an individual accruing a small loss to avoid a 
larger loss, and as a result, the individual tends to attempt 
to avoid the initial loss by seeking a risk that may result 
in either larger or few if any losses. A fear appeal 
emphasizing loss may make the individual more aware of the 
potential for the larger losses of a risky decision and thus 
more risk-averse (cooperative). 2) Similarly, the positive 
appeal would elicit greater cooperation from individuals 
confronted with the commons dilemma (take-some game). In 
contrast to the public goods problem, the commons dilemma 
initially frames the decision in terms of smaller immediate 
individual gain to avoid future detrimental consequences. As 
a result of this framing, individuals tend to be risk-averse 
and settle for the "sure thing". A positive appeal 





Participants were 180 students from Loyola University 
Chicago who were enrolled in Psychology 101, and able to 
participate in experiments for class credit. 
Materials 
The design of the study was a 2 x 3 factorial, crossing 
type of task {give-some versus take-some) with message type 
{positive/gains oriented versus negative/losses oriented 
versus no message) . 
The following materials were used for the study: a 
negative and positive persuasive appeal (Appendices A and B); 
give-some and take-some game instructions (Appendices C and 
D); and a post-game questionnaire (Appendices E, F, and G). 
Both the appeals and the game instructions were developed 
through a series of focus groups conducted at the College of 
Lake County, Grayslake, Il. 
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The persuasive appeals were developed by asking three 
classes of psychology students (two introductory classes and 
one social psychology class) to rate a series of experiences 
as either negative (i.e., an experience resulting in a 
personal loss) or positive (i.e., an experience resulting in 
a personal gain), and then list as many as three individual 
costs or benefits of the experience. For example, the 
students were asked to rate experiences such as fighting and 
not fighting with a friend, being drafted and not drafted 
into the armed services, and contributing and not 
contributing to the maintenance of the environment. Those 
experiences and costs most frequently perceived as negative 
were used to create the negative/losses oriented message 
appeal and those experiences and benefits most frequently 
perceived as positive formed the positive/gains oriented 
message appeal. 
The game instructions were first developed by the author 
and then modified by asking the three classes of students for 
feedback on the clarity and comprehension of the 
instructions, and the ability to confidently understand and 
play the game. Final modifications were made via suggestions 
from various other persons (e.g., professors, other 
researchers, and professional writers and editors). 
For the give-some game, participants read that they 
were to earn as much money as possible. The amount earned 
was contingent upon a decision by each group member. Every 
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group member had to decide to either "keep" or "give" $3 
provided by the experimenter. For each group member that 
gave the $3 back to the experimenter, the experimenter 
awarded $2 to all group members. Thus, if everyone gave, 
everyone would make $6. If a group member kept the $3 from 
the experimenter, the individual would earn either $3, $5 , 
or $7 for 0, l, and 2 givers respectively. Table 1 below 
illustrates the game's payoff structure. 
For the take-some game, participants also read that they 
were to earn as much money as possible, and that the amount 
earned would be contingent upon a decision by each group 
member. The difference was that every group member was to 
decide to "not take" or "take" $3 from a pool of money 
provided by the experimenter. For each group member that did 
not take the $3, a dividend of $2 was awarded to all group 
members. Thus, if everyone did not take, everyone would make 
$6. If a group member took the $3 from the pool, the 




PAYOFF MATRIX FOR "THE GIVE-SOME & TAKE-SOME GAMES" 
# OF $TO $TO 
GIVERS/NO NT AKERS KEEPERS/TAKERS GIVERS/NO NT AKERS 
3 -------- $ 6.00 
2 $ 7.00 $ 4.00 
1 $ 5.00 $ 2.00 
0 $ 3.00 --------
Note that the payoff structures for both game conditions 
were identical. The only difference between the games 
was that the give-some game was initially framed in terms of 
losses and the take-some game was initially framed in terms 
of gains. 
Procedure 
Participants arrived in groups of three and were 
randomly assigned to one of the six experimental conditions. 
Regardless of the condition, each session began with the 
experimenter stating that the study addresses influences on 
decision making. In addition, it was stressed that there was 
to be no talking until the end of the experiment. However, 
prior to the playing of the game, questions concerning the 
game instructions were permitted. 
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After these general instructions, the actual experiment 
began. One third of the groups received and read either a 
positive appeal, a negative appeal, or no appeal at all. The 
appeals were virtually identical in terms of length and 
content. The only difference between the appeals was that 
the positive appeal emphasized the individual gains 
associated with acting for the collective good, and the 
negative appeal emphasized the individual losses associated 
with selfish behavior. When all the participants finished 
reading the appeal, the experimenter collected it and 
distributed the instructions for the game task. 
Half of the participants received the give-some 
game instructions and the other half received the take-some 
game instructions. The experimenter read the game 
instruction to the players, and then each player was asked to 
anonymously make their choice. However, groups that did not 
receive cash payments were told the final outcome of the 
game. Groups receiving payments were not told the outcome of 
the game and payments were distributed privately. In order 
to accomplish this, each group member recorded their decision 
on a ballot that was coded with a number. The experimenter 
collected the ballots, determined the outcome, and put the 
appropriate payments (see below) in envelopes with numbers 
corresponding to the ballots and players. 
Each session had only about a 17% chance of receiving 
cash payoffs. In order to determine whether a session of 
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players was to receive cash for their play, a die was tossed 
twice at the conclusion of the game. If the second roll of 
the die matched the first roll, each player received a cash 
payment that matched their earned payoff. No payments were 
distributed if the two rolls of the die did not produce 
identical numbers. 
Participants were also asked to fill out a post-game 
questionnaire. Those participants that read a persuasive 
appeal received a questionnaire with the following questions: 
1) How clear were the game instructions?; 2) How clear were 
the game payoffs?; 3) Do you think the game presented an 
opportunity to gain or lose money?; 4) What do you think was 
the aim of the games decision task?; 5) Did you expect others 
to give/not take or keep/take?; 6) How clear was the message 
content?; 7) Was it easy or difficult to read the message?; 
8) Was there a relationship between the message and the 
game?; 9) Did you agree with the message; and 10) How 
believable was the message? 
Each of the ten questions had a bi-polar, semantic 
differential scale ranging from 1 to 7 where 1 was the most 
positive {better/more) response and 7 was the most negative 
{worse/less) response. For example question three above had 
a rating scale anchored by "gain" (1) and "lose" (7), and 
questions one and six were anchored by "clear" (1) and 
"unclear" (7). In addition to the 10 questions, the 
questionnaire also presented a list of ten descriptive 
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adjectives for the messages. Each participant was asked to 
pick all the adjectjves that described the message that was 
read. As for the post-game questionnaire for the no message 
conditions, it only contained questions 1 - 5 above since the 
remaining questions pertained to the messages only. 
After all participants completed the questionnaire 
and/or payments were distributed, they were debriefed orally 
and with a written description of the study. When there were 




Game type (2) by message type (3) analysis of variances 
were performed on all the dependent variables described 
below. Since there were no significant main effects or 
interactions for all but one dependent variable, the means of 
the dependent variables have been provided in Tables 2 and 3 
below to clearly illustrate trends in the data. For those 
analyses involving participant's decisions (i.e., defect or 
cooperate), the dependent variable was the dichotomous 
decision to take (defect) or not take (cooperate) in the 
take-some game and keep or give in the give-some game. 
TABLE 2 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF COOPERATORS 
NO POSITIVE NEGATIVE GAME 
GAME TYPE MESSAGE MESSAGE MESSAGE MEAN 
TAKE-SOME 0.80 1.2 1.2 1.07 
GIVE-SOME 0.60 1.2 1.3 1.03 




Although there was no significant difference in the rate 
of cooperation between the various conditions, Table 2 
exhibits an interesting data pattern. Given either message, 
the rate of cooperation (M = 1.2 and M = 1.25) is greater 
(though not significantly so) than that in the no message 
conditions (M = 0.70). That is, it appears the two appeals 
(i.e., negative and positive) promote a somewhat greater 
degree of cooperation. This is consistent with other studies 
such as those on the effects of moralizing (see review by 
Dawes, 1981). 
It should be noted that both the negative and positive 
message conditions exhibited practically the same rate of 
cooperation. This was contrary to expectation and 
surprisingly so because chi-square analyses indicated that 
the messages were perceived as significantly and correctly 
different (i.e., as negative or positive) by the study 
participants. Table 4 illustrates the frequency of the 
selection of adjectives used to describe the messages as 
well as the obtained chi-square values. The negative message 
was perceived to be significantly more negative, pessimistic, 
fearful, and depressing than the positive message, and the 
positive message was seen as significantly more positive, and 
optimistic than the negative message. 
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TABLE 3 
MEAN RATINGS FOR POST-GAME QUESTIONNAIRE ITEM VARIABLES 1-5 
QUESTION GAME NO POSITIVE NEGATIVE GAME 
TYPE MESSAGE MESSAGE MESSAGE MEAN 
Clarity of TAKE-SOME 3.13 2.30 2.17 2.53 
Grune 
Instructions GIVE-SOME 2.50 2.17 1.96 2.21 
(Clear vs. MESSAGE 
Not Clear) MEAN 2.82 2.24 2.07 2.37 
Clarity of TAKE-SOME 2.70 2.20 2.07 2.32 
Grune 
Payoffs GIVE-SOME 2.30 1.80 2.03 2.04 
(Clear vs. MESSAGE 
Not Clear) MEAN 2.50 2.00 2.05 2.18 
Perceived TAKE-SOME 2.77 2.77 2.67 2.74 
Opportunity 
oft Grune GIVE-SOME 2.23 2.40 2.40 2.34 
(Gain vs. MESSAGE 
Lose) MEAN 2.50 2.61 2.54 2.54 
Perceived TAKE-SOME 2.97 3.67 3.67 3.45 
Aimof 
Grune GIVE-SOME 2.80 2.93 3.13 2.95 
(Gain vs. MESSAGE 
lose) MEAN 2.89 3.30 3.25 3.20 
Expected 
Decision of TAKE-SOME 3.73 2.80 3.50 3.34 
Others 
(Give/Not GIVE-SOME 3.23 3.60 3.13 3.32 
Take vs. MESSAGE 
Keep/Take) MEAN 3.48 3.20 3.32 3.33 
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TABLE 3 (CONTINUED) 
MEAN RATINGS FOR POST-GAME QUESTIONNAIRE ITEM VARIABLES 6-10 
QUESTION GAME NO POSITIVE NEGATIVE GAME 
TYPE MESSAGE MESSAGE MESSAGE MEAN 
Clarity of TAKE-SOME ---- 2.57 2.67 2.62 
Message 
Content GIVE-SOME ---- 2.77 2.47 2.62 
MESSAGE 
MEAN ---- 2.67 2.57 2.62 
Difficulty of TAKE-SOME ---- 2.37 2.56 2.46 
Message 
Reading GIVE-SOME ---- 2.26 2.10 2.18 
MESSAGE 
MEAN ---- 2.32 2.33 2.32 
Perceived 
Relationship TAKE-SOME ---- 2.47 2.67 2.57 
Between 
Message an GIVE-SOME ---- 2.27 2.20 2.24 
and Grune MESSAGE 
MEAN ---- 2.37 2.44 2.40 
Agreeance TAKE-SOME ---- 3.47 2.87 3.17 
with the 
Message GIVE-SOME ---- 2.93 2.83 2.88 
MESSAGE 
MEAN ---- 3.20 2.85 3.02 
Believability TAKE-SOME ---- 3.37 2.80 3.08 
of the 
Message GIVE-SOME ---- 3.20 2.80 3.00 
MESSAGE 
MEAN ---- 3.29 2.80 3.04 
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Manipulation Checks and Expectations 
The comparability of the games and messages was assessed 
by measuring the perceived similarities among the games and 
among the messages. The variables assessed were the clarity 
of the game instructions, the clarity of the game payoff 
structures, the perceived· opportunity of the game (i.e., the 
opportunity to gain or lose money), the perceived aim of the 
game's decision task, the expected choice of the other 
players, the clarity of the message content, the 
understandability of the message, the perceived relationship 
between the game and message, and the extent of message 
acceptance and credibility. 
The game instructions were significantly less clear 
(E(l,54)=4.25, £ < .02) in the no message conditions than in 
either of the message conditions. However, the game 
instructions were about equally clear in the positive message 
condition (M = 2.24) and the negative message condition (M = 
2.07). This suggests that the messages may have enhanced the 
clarity of the instructions by providing real life examples 
of the game. 
Although none of the remaining manipulation checks 
produced significant outcomes, several mentionable trends and 
data patterns emerged. Table 3 above contains the means of 
these variables for each experimental condition. 
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TABLE 4 
PARTICIPANTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE PERSUASIVE APPEALS 
POSITIVE NEGATIVE CHI-
PERCEPTION (ADJECTIVE) MESSAGE MESSAGE SQUARE 
(% YES) (% YES) VALUE 
(DF =1) 
Message seen as positive 77% 39% 17.34** 
Message seen as negative 10% 24% 4.01* 
Message seen as moralistic 40% 56% 3.03 
Message seen as optimistic 58% 24% 14.71 ** 
Message seen as pessimistic 3% 24% 10.63** 
Message seen as fearful 5% 22% 7.42** 
Message seen as ethical 47% 41% 0.43 
Message seen as enlightening 13% 15% 0.09 
Message seen as persuasive 55% 47% 0.68 
Message seen as depressing 2% 27% 15.74** 
NOTE: '*' signifies E < .05 and '**' signifies E < .01 
The game payoffs were marginally less clear in the no 
message conditions (.Ell,54)=2.48, E <.09). Again, it seems 
as if the messages may have made the game instructions easier 
to understand. Also, the give-some game payoffs were rated 
as slightly more clear (M = 2.04) than the take-some game 
payoffs (M = 2.32). This may be attributed to the fact that 
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the give-some game instructions were less convoluted. That 
is, the take-some game instructions included a reference to a 
"pool" of money/resources that grew with cooperative choices 
and diminished with defective choices, and the give-some game 
did not. 
The give-some game was perceived as presenting a 
marginally greater opportunity to gain money (E(l,54)=2.80, E 
< .10). Also, the aim of the give-some game's decisional 
task was seen as that of acquiring gains (E(l,54)=3.57, E < 
.06). These trends support prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984) which states that the give-some game's initial 
decision is framed as an opportunity to avoid a larger loss 
(i.e., gain money) by incurring an initial small loss. 
As for the expected choice of the other players, players 
in both game conditions had a slight expectation (M = 3.34 
and M = 3.32) of cooperative behavior (i.e., not take or 
give) . This contradicts prospect theory in that the framing 
of the take-some game should lead to less cooperative 
behavior as thus an expectation of less cooperation from 
others. 
In regards to the message variables, the positive 
message (M = 2.67) and the negative message (M = 2.57) had 
approximately the same level of content clarity 
(E(l,36)=0.14, E < .70). Also, players tended to agree more 
(E(l,36)=1.56, E < .21) with the negative message (M = 2.85) 
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than the positive message (M = 3.2). Finally, the negative 
message (M = 2.8) was rated as more credible (E(l,36)=3.61, E 
< .06) than the positive message (M = 3.29). The latter two 
findings are consistent with previous research regarding the 
effect of persuasive appeals. 
CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
Although the main predictions of this study were not 
borne out, there was a trend for a main effect of message 
type. Both the negative and positive message conditions had 
approximately the same rate of cooperation, and this level of 
cooperation was slightly greater than that in the no message 
conditions. This finding is consistent with the literature 
on the effects of positive, moralistic message appeals (see 
review by Dawes, 1981) and fear-arousing appeals (e.g., 
Rogers and Mewborn, 1976). Significant results supporting 
previous research may have been obtained if some of this 
studies limitations could have been controlled. 
First, there may have been a problem with statistical 
power. Although, 10 observations per condition is the 
recommended minimum for having adequate statistical power to 
detect a significant difference (Lipsey, 1990), more 
observations (e.g., 20) may have elicited significant 
findings. 
Second, there was minimal ecological validity. That is, 
there were only three people per group and the group members 
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were playing with a small amount of money that was not their 
own. In actuality, a social dilemma would entail much larger 
groups and greater amounts of personal money or resources. 
More participants per group and larger sums of money for the 
game's payoffs may have produced significant differences 
between the study conditions. 
Third, contrary to the participants of other studies 
(e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), participants of this study 
did not perceive the games as presenting different 
opportunities and goals. This may be attributed to the fact 
that this study utilized a one-shot methodology. That is, 
the participants of this study only played the game once. 
Social dilemma studies typically use a methodology that 
includes several iterations of the game (e.g., Brewer, & 
Kramer, 1986). Therefore, it may be necessary for 
participants to play several iterations of the game before 
they fully understand it and an effect can be pulled. 
Relatedly, dilemma games usually start with the players 
either receiving some money (the give-some game) or seeing 
some common resource of money or points (the take-some game) . 
In this study, the players started with hypothetical money 
for both games, and only received actual money for a "lucky" 
role of a die. Tangible materials and rewards may be 
influential factors in obtaining a framing (game) effect. 
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Finally, a message effect may not have been obtained 
because of the content of this study's messages. Fishbein 
and Ajzen (1975 and 1981) have argued that in order to change 
behavior, you need to change the specific beliefs that 
underlie the behavior. There is no evidence indicating that 
this study's participants had their beliefs changed about 
anything, much less the beliefs that were relevant and 
important to game behavior. 
In sum, although there was a failure to find evidence 
supporting the effects of decision framing and persuasive 
appeals on choice behavior in a social dilenuna, there was an 
interesting message trend that emerged. Further studies with 
less methodological flaws need to be conducted in order to 
more thoroughly and accurately assess the effect of 
persuasive message appeals on the choice behavior in social 
dilenunas. 
APPENDIX A 
NEGATIVE MESSAGE APPEAL 
To Cooperate or Not. That is the Question 
Cooperation is one of the first lessons that every 
child is taught as early as kindergarten or the first grade. 
Ironically, it is a behavior that many neglect throughout 
their lives or abandon later in life. One explanation for 
this neglect of cooperative behavior is that people are not 
aware of the ramifications associated with a lack of 
cooperation. The following are four examples of how a lack 
of cooperation leads to extremely likely individual losses. 
1) A confrontation among friends or family members is often 
the result of a lack of cooperation. When two or more people 
are unwilling to work together to reach an understanding or a 
compromise, emotions run high and tempers begin to flare. 
Everyone involved will most likely suffer some type of loss. 
For example, fights usually result in one or more of the 
following: the end of a great friendship or relationship; 
regret; the loss of the ability to maintain self-
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control/reason, and a decrease in self-respect and the 
respect of mutual friends or others. 
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2) "War," an extremely large-scale confrontation, is also 
the result of non-cooperative behavior and, obviously, the 
individual consequences are more severe than a two or three 
person quarrel. 
The loss of one's life is highly probable during war 
time as is the loss of family and friends. Also, the 
militarized individual must give up his/her freedom, and 
dignity and is often required to engage in activities that 
defy all of his/her ideologies, morals, values, and beliefs. 
For those fortunate enough to physically and mentally survive 
combat duty during a war, there is still the irreplaceable 
loss of time. That is to say, the loss of time that could 
have been spent enjoying family and friends, pursuing 
interests, and obtaining goals. 
3) The quality of our environment is also contingent upon 
cooperation. This is because the maintenance, preservation 
and improvement of the environment takes consideration, 
contributions, and efforts from all of society's members. 
Obviously, there has not been enough cooperation to date as 
is evidenced by the current state of the environment. Every 
individual member of society has experienced a gradual yet 
steady loss in the quality of air and water. Additionally, 
oxygen-producing rain forests are being destroyed, the ozone 
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is depleting, resources are becoming exhausted, and landfills 
and dumps are reaching maximum capacity as new sites are 
becoming scare. All of these environmental conditions are 
undoubtedly health hazards for all inhabitants of the planet. 
In addition to the obvious health hazards, each 
individual that does not help maintain the environment incurs 
many psychological losses. Many people often report that a 
lack of involvement and concern results in decreased self-
esteem, self-respect, and social approval. 
4) Advances in medicine, and the alleviation of social 
problems also require cooperative efforts from all members of 
society. If resources such as funding and manpower for 
research institutions and charitable organizations are 
insubstantial or unavailable, every individual has an 
increased chance of suffering tremendous personal losses. 
The most prominent and detrimental losses are to advances in 
medicine, and technology. These losses consequently lead to 
a less comfortable life and a possible premature death. 
For those fortunate enough to avoid chronic or terminal 
illness, the failure to contribute to research institutions 
and charitable organizations entails psychological losses. 
For example, not contributing has been attributed to the lack 
or loss of empathy (the ability to identify with another) and 
the lack of sympathy (the ability to share anothers ideas and 
feelings). Decreased feelings of satisfaction, pride, 
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involvement, and concern for others have also been linked not 
contributing. 
These examples illustrate that a lack of cooperation 
definitely leads to individual losses. If people were more 
aware of these losses, cooperation among people might be 
enhanced. 
APPENDIX B 
POSITIVE MESSAGE APPEAL 
To Cooperate or Not. That is the Question 
Cooperation is one of the first lessons that every child 
is taught as early as kindergarten or the first grade. 
Ironically, it is a behavior that many neglect throughout 
their lives or abandon later in life. One explanation for 
this neglect of cooperative behavior is that people are not 
aware of the positive consequences associated with 
cooperation. The following are four examples of how 
cooperation leads to extremely likely individual gains. 
1) The avoidance of a confrontation with friends or family 
members is often the result of cooperation. When two or more 
people are willing to work together to reach an understanding 
or a compromise, emotions remain stable and tempers do not 
flare. Each individual involved will most likely receive 
some type of gain. For example, avoiding a fight usually 
results in one or more of the following: the maintenance or 
strengthening of a great friendship or relationship, peace 
and understanding, the ability to maintain or gain self-
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control/reason, and an increase in self-respect and the 
respect of mutual friends or others. 
2) Avoiding 11 war 11 an extremely large scale confrontation, 
is also the result of cooperative behavior and, obviously, 
the individual rewards or "gains" are greater than those 
associated with avoiding a two or three person quarrel. 
Sparing one's life and those of family and friends are 
gains resulting from the avoidance of war. Also, an 
individual civilian (as opposed to a serviceman) is able to 
maintain his/her freedom and dignity, and advance his/her 
ideologies, morals, values, and beliefs. Lastly, there is 
the gain of time. That is to say, the gain of time spent 
enjoying family and friends, pursuing interests, and 
obtaining goals. 
3) The quality of our environment is also contingent upon 
cooperation. This is because the maintenance, preservation 
and improvement of the environment takes consideration, 
contributions, and efforts from all of society's members. 
Obviously, a better environment results in greater physical 
health for all. If enough is done by all, every individual 
member of society will experience a gradual yet steady 
increase in the quality of air and water. In addition, 
oxygen producing rain forests will flourish, the ozone will 
stop depleting, natural resources will be plentiful, and 
landfills and dumps will not occupy inhabitable land. 
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In addition to the obvious health gains, each individual 
that helps maintain the environment experiences many 
psychological gains. Many people often report that 
involvement and concern results in greater self-esteem, self-
respect, and social approval. 
4) Advances in medicine and the alleviation of social 
problems also require cooperative efforts from all members of 
society. If resources such as funding and manpower for 
research institutions and charitable organizations are 
substantial or available, every individual has an increased 
chance of acquiring tremendous personal gains. The most 
prominent and beneficial gains are advances in medicine and 
technology. These gains consequently lead to a more 
comfortable life and the avoidance of a possible premature 
death. 
For those fortunate enough to avoid chronic illness or 
disease, contributions to research institutions and 
charitable organizations entails definite psychological 
gains. For example, contributing has been attributed to the 
acquisition of empathy (the ability to identify with another) 
and the acquisition of sympathy (the ability to share 
anothers ideas and feelings). Increased feelings of 
satisfaction, pride, involvement, and concern for others have 
also been linked to contributing. 
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These examples illustrate that cooperation leads to 
individual gains. If people were more aware of these gains, 
cooperation among people might be enhanced. 
APPENDIX C 
GIVE-SOME GAME INSTRUCTIONS 
Instructions for Playing "The Give-Some Game" 
The game that you are about to play is a 3-person game 
of choice that is characterized by a high degree of 
interdependence. This means that the choice you make will 
effect the outcomes of the other players and that the choices 
of the other players will effect your outcome. 
The object of the game is to make as much money as you 
can. The game starts out with the experimenter giving each 
player $3. Then, each player has two choices. The player 
may decide to keep the $3, or he/she may give the $3 back to 
the experimenter. If the player returns the $3, the 
experimenter will then give $2 to each player in the game. 
Thus, if all three players keep the $3, then each player gets 
a $3 payoff. However, if all three players give the money 
back to the experimenter, then each player gets $6. Thus, 
players' payoffs are interdependent - they depend on the 
behavior of both the individual player and the behavior of 
the other players in the game. The payoff matrix below 




Payoff Matrix for "The Give Some Game" 
Number of $ To Keepers $ To Givers 
Givers 
3 ------ $ 6.00 
2 $ 7.00 $ 4.00 
1 $ 5.00 $ 2.00 
0 $ 3.00 ------
In the event that 2 players "give" and 1 player "keeps," the 
2 players would receive a payoff of $4 (2 givers X $2), and 
the player would receive a payoff of $7 (2 X $2 + $3). 
Notice the two following properties of the payoff 
matrix: 1) as previously mentioned, the individual payoff for 
all players choosing to keep is less than the individual 
payoff for all players choosing to give; and 2) the 
individual payoff for keeping is greater than the individual 
payoff for becoming an additional giver. Though the choice to 
keep results in a greater individual payoff, all players 
deciding to keep will provide everyone a smaller payoff than 
all players deciding to give. 
When making your decision, you will not be able to 
communicate with the other players. Therefore, your decision 
will have to be based on the amount of money you desire and 
the expected choices of the other players. 
To cast your decision, please write either give or keep 
on the numbered slip of paper that has been provided for you, 
and then hand it to the experimenter. Note and remember the 
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number on the slip of paper because after the experimenter 
determines the payoffs, your payoff will be put in an 
envelope that is marked with a number that corresponds to the 
number on the slip. This procedure will assure that none of 
the other players will know the choice you made. 
Take as long as you need to make your decision and 
please feel free to ask the experimenter any questions that 
you may have. 
APPENDIX D 
TAKE-SOME GAME INSTRUCTIONS 
Instructions for Playing "The Take-Some Game" 
The game that you are about to play is a 3-person game 
of choice that is characterized by a high degree of 
interdependence. This means that the choice you make will 
effect the outcomes of the other players and that the choices 
of the other players will effect your outcome. 
The object of the game is to make as much money as you 
can. The game starts out with the experimenter having a pool 
of money. Each player in the game has two choices. The 
player can either take $3 from the pool or he/she can decide 
not to take the $3. For each player that does not take the 
$3, the pool grows and pays a $2 dividend to each player. 
Thus, if all three players take $3, then they each make $3 in 
the game. However, if all three players decide not to take 
the $3, then each player gets $6 (3 non-takers X $2 
dividend). Thus, players' payoffs are interdependent - they 
depend on the behavior of both the individual player and the 
behavior of the other players in the game. The payoff matrix 




Payoff Matrix for "The Take Some Game" 
Number of $ To Takers $ To 
Non-takers Non-takers 
3 ------ $ 6.00 
2 $ 7.00 $ 4.00 
1 $ 5.00 $ 2.00 
0 $ 3.00 ------
In the event that 2 players decide to "not take" and 1 
player decides to take, the two players would receive a $4 
payoff (2 non-takers X $2 dividend), and the 1 player would 
receive a $7 payoff (2 X $2 + $3). 
Notice the following properties of the payoff matrix: 1) 
as previously mentioned, the individual payoff for all 
players choosing to take is less than the individual payoff 
for all players choosing not to take; and 2) the individual 
payoff for taking is greater than the individual payoff for 
becoming an additional non-taker. Though the choice to take 
results in a greater individual payoff, all players deciding 
to take will provide everyone a smaller payoff than all 
players deciding not to take. 
When making your decision, you will not be able to 
communicate with the other players. Therefore, your decision 
will have to be based on the amount of money you desire and 
the expected choices of the other players. 
To cast your decision, please write either take or not 
take on the numbered slip of paper that has been provided for 
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you, and then hand it to the experimenter. Note and remember 
the number on the slip of paper because after the 
experimenter determines the payoffs, your payoff will be put 
in an envelope that is marked with a number that corresponds 
to the number on the slip. This procedure will assure that 
none of the other players will know the choice you made. 
Take as long as you need to make your decision and 
please feel free to ask the experimenter any questions that 
you may have. 
APPENDIX E 
POST-GAME QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE GIVE-SOME GAME 
Post-Game Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions that pertain to 
the game you just played and the message you read earlier. 
1. How clear were the game instructions? 
Very clear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not clear 
2. How clear were the payoffs for the choices/decisions? 
Very clear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not clear 
3. Do you think the game presented the opportunity to lose 
money or gain money? 
Lose 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Gain 
4. What do you think was the aim of the game's decision task? 
Restrict losses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acquire gains 
5. Did you expect other players to give or keep? 
Give 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Keep 
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6. How clear was the content of the message? 
Very Clear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not Clear 
7. Was it easy or difficult to read the message? 
Difficult 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Easy 
8. Do you feel that there was a relationship between the 
message and the game? 
No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Yes 
9. Did you agree with the message you read? 
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree 
10. How believable was the message you read? 
Believable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not Believable 
11. Please circle the characteristics that you feel best 
describes the message you read (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY) . 
A. Positive D. Optimistic G. Ethical 
B. Negative E. Pessimistic H. Enlightening 
c. Moralistic F. Fearful I. Persuasive 
J. Depressing 
APPENDIX F 
POST-GAME QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE TAKE-SOME GAME 
Post-Game Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions that pertain to 
the game you just played and the message you read earlier. 
1. How clear were the game instructions? 
Very clear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not clear 
2. How clear were the payoffs for the choices/decisions? 
Very clear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not clear 
3. Do you think the game presented the opportunity to lose 
money or gain money? 
Lose 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Gain 
4. What do you think was the aim of the decision task? 
Restrict losses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acquire gains 
5. Did you expect other players to take or not take? 
Take 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not Take 
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6. How clear was the content of the message? 
Very Clear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not Clear 
Comment{s): 
7 . Was it easy or difficult to read the message? 
Difficult 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Easy 
Comment{s): 
8. Do you feel that there was a relationship between the 
message and the game? 
No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Yes 
9. Did you agree with the message you read? 
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree 
10. How believable was the message you read? 
Believable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not Believable 
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11. Please circle the characteristics that you feel best 
describes the message you read (YOU MAY CIRCLE MORE THAN ONE 
RESPONSE). 
A. Positive F. Fearful 
B. Negative G. Ethical 
c. Moralistic H. Enlightening 
D. Optimistic I. Persuasive 
E. Pessimistic J. Depressing 
APPENDIX G 
POST-GAME QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE NO MESSAGE CONDITIONS 
Post-Game Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions that pertain to 
the game you just played. 
1. How clear were the game instructions? 
Very clear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not clear 
2. How clear were the payoffs for the choices/decisions? 
Very clear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not clear 
3. Do you think the game presented the opportunity to lose 
money or gain money? 
Lose 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Gain 
4. What do you think was the aim of the decision task? 
Restrict losses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acquire gains 
5. Did you expect other players to take or not take? 
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